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Internal organization relies heavily on psychological consistency requirements. This
perspective has been emphasized in modern compensation theory, but has not been extended
to organization theory. The idea is developed by starting from Williamson’s discussion of
idiosyncratic exchange. The perspective sheds new light on several topics in the theory
of the firm, like the boundaries of the firm (“Williamson’s puzzle”), the importance of
fairness concerns within firms, the attenuation of incentives, or the role of routines. It
implies a “perceptional” theory of the firm that is “realistic” in the sense advocated by
Coase (1937). (JEL: B52, D02, L2)
Internal organization relies heavily on psychological consistency requirements. I shall develop
this idea, starting from Williamson’s discussion of idiosyncratic exchange. The view will shed
new light on several topics in the theory of the firm: its boundaries, the importance of fairness
concerns within firms, or the attenuation of incentives. It implies a “perceptional” theory of the
firm that is “realistic” in the sense advocated by Coase (1937).
1 Small Numbers
Co-ordination in a well-matched team is typically characterized by specialization of the team
members and the absence of relevant competition for each specialist. In such a setting, market
co-ordination seems less useful. It would invite strategic behavior, and would necessitate
protective measures to shield against such tactics. Each team member could threaten to block
the gains from co-operation unless paid a larger share of the surplus. The potential conflicts and
concomitant safeguards involve sunk costs, to be counted as transaction costs. Such transaction
costs are quite different from—and more important than—the costs “of discovering what the
relevant prices are,” as there are many ways of splitting any surplus, and there is no clear-cut
way for “discovering” any set of relevant prices.1 The costs for settling disputes may be
∗Final version to appear in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. I thank an anonymous referee
for suggestions and insightful comments on an earlier draft.
1There are game-theoretic solutions to such problems, but these solutions leave the problem basically unsettled.
The “folk theorem” would state that any distribution could be sustained in an infinite co-operative setting,
whereas the core of such a splitting game will always be empty, implying that any successful co-operation
would require a reduction of possibilities for bargaining. Both lines of thought would suggest the formation of
a normative system to overcome those bargaining problems, as has been suggested by Williamson (1975, 30)
early on. The quotation is taken from Coase (1937, 88).
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considerable in any small number setting unless organizational features and firm-specific norms
are implemented that reduce the costs of higgling and haggling.
Organizational features and firm-specific norms may curb rent-seeking activity by ruling
out some alternatives, or rendering them more costly to pursue. A policy for example, that
requires equal treatment of all employees according to certain principles restrains the individual
worker from seeking an exception, because all concessions made to him will generalize to other
workers. This renders it more costly for the firm to make such concessions, and less promising
for the individual worker to request them. As a result, rent seeking activity and associated
transaction costs are reduced, and the employment relationship becomes more efficient ex ante
as well as ex post. We can expect organizational solutions to outcompete market solutions
in such cases.2 More generally, co-ordination within firms pertains to well-matched teams
that entail, almost by definition, small-number problems, and firms that rely on non-market
organization may obtain better results than the market could achieve. As a consequence, prices
are rarely used within firms to co-ordinate the division of labor. Even if payments serve as
incentives, they do not perform any market clearing function (Schlicht, 1998, 229-31).
2 Markets, Hierarchies, and Custom
Following Oliver Williamson, I assume that behavior within an organization is motivated and
controlled differently from what occurs in the market, and I shall emphasize the importance
of psychological consistency for internal organization. But before doing that, let me discuss
briefly a position that denies the theoretical usefulness of distinguishing between markets and
firms in terms of different modes of control. According to this view, all behavior, whether
occurring in the market or within firms, is governed by incentives, and a firm is to be interpreted
as a specialized market, rather than a categorically different organizational form (Holmstrom,
1982). As Alchian and Demsetz (1972, 777) explain: “Telling an employee to type this letter
rather than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather
than that brand of bread.” According to this view, no useful analytical distinction can be drawn
between command and free choice, even if people in real life happen to make such a distinction.
People don’t change their nature when entering a firm. Whether inside or outside a firm, their
behavior is controlled by the same behavioral tendencies. If they behave differently within the
firm or in the marketplace, this is to be attributed to the different sets of incentives provided.
Human behavior is always to be analyzed in terms of (given) preferences and constraints. I
shall refer to this view as the the principal-agent view of the firm, and I am going to criticize it.
I accept the thesis that people do not change their nature when entering a firm, but I take them
as norm-guided within firms to much larger extent than in the market.3 Firms use normative
structures for purposes of internal co-ordination that are absent or strongly attenuated in markets,
and this enables them to outperform markets.
2Similar constraints on bargaining may arise in markets as well, but will, as a rule, be less powerful. Such
complications are discounted in the following in order to simplify the exposition.
3The view advanced here builds in part on Isaac et al. (1991) who emphasize that institutions (and therefore
firms) frame fairness perceptions which entail strong behavioral effects. See also Schlicht (1998) for further
discussion.
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Many writers have rejected the principal-agent view of the firm, often implicitly. Ronald
Coase (1937, 54) has been outspoken, however. He draws a distinction between a principal-
agent relationship and a master-servant relationship and cites Batt (1929, 6) to the effect “that
which distinguishes an agent from a servant is not the absence or presence of a fixed wage, or
the payment only of commission on business done, but rather the freedom with which an agent
may carry out his employment.” From this he concludes that the employment contract differs
from a principal-agent relationship. It is a “master-servant” relationship, involving “control”
and “direction.” I take it that “control” and “direction” refer to normative control of behavior.
Herbert Simon (1951) has re-iterated the point that the employment contract establishes an
authority relation, and Oliver Williamson followed the lead. He drew a distinction between
markets and hierarchies and pointed out that the market will select that mode of co-ordination
that minimizes overall production costs—a view which I am going to accept in this paper.
The dichotomy between markets and hierarchies found in Coase, Simon and Williamson is to
be complemented by taking account of duty and custom. Leibenstein (1957) has highlighted
this when depicting the firm as a network of interrelated jobs. Each job is associated with duties
and responsibilities, entitlements and obligations. The organization of work is achieved, in his
view, by the way in which appropriate norms, attached to jobs, govern behavior.
A closely related argument has been invoked by Nelson and Winter (1982). They start, like
Williamson, with the observation that the market does not work well in settings of idiosyncratic
exchange. There may initially be a quarrel among the team members for obtaining larger
shares of the surplus at the expense of the others, but eventually a ’truce’ will emerge which is
maintained and defended by everybody because “each member strives to protect his interests
by standing prepared to deliver a firm rebuff not only to actions by others that clearly threaten
his interests, but also to actions that might be quite innocuous were it not for their possible
interpretation as probes of his alertness or determination to defend his rights under a truce”
(Nelson and Winter, 1982, 111). For such reasons, everybody defends the firm-specific
norms and customs even in cases where he is not personally affected.
3 Entitlements, Obligations, and Organizational Equilibrium
The above discussion can be developed as follows. In a first step, an organization could be
interpreted as a set of conventions. But why do people obey these conventions? One answer
would be to think of a set of self-sustaining conventions which everybody obeys because it
is in everybody’s interest to follow these conventions provided everybody else does the same
(Kreps, 1990). This view may be adequate for dealing with pure co-ordination problems, like
driving on the right-hand side of the road. It is the easy case and does not involve any problem.
Such a system would work automatically, and there would be no further need for governance,
and hardly any need for a firm as we know it.
The small-number problems arising in teams give rise, however, to co-ordination problems
of a different kind. They require a splitting of the surplus accruing from co-operation. They
involve potential conflict. An organization must cope with these problems. A convention to
split a surplus according to a certain rule cannot easily be self-enforcing because some team
members may be first movers. They could try to increase their share in the surplus, knowing
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that it would be rational for the others to accommodate with this step. The threat to cease
co-operating would be irrational for the later movers. In other words, the idea of viewing an
organization as a set of conventions which are maintained out of self-interest of the participants
seems very problematic.
Yet evidence suggests that people actually do behave “irrationally” if they feel cheated. They
try to defend what they perceive their entitlements, even if this involves substantial costs to
them. Effective norms are defended in this manner. Strategic behavior is channeled by these
firm-specific norms. If the firm adheres to principles of equal treatment of equals, for example,
a worker will anticipate that any concession made to him will induce other workers to seek the
same advantage. Hence he will rather look for fostering his own advantage within the given set
of norms and principles. This channels his activity. In this way, improvements in governance
can induce better performance.
Further, effective norms shape compliance. They induce entitlements and obligations.
Entitlements are rights, as perceived by the individuals. They are, however, not abstract legal
rights. Rather, they denote the subjectively perceived rights that go along with a motivational
disposition to defend them. Obligations are the counterparts of entitlements. They refer
to claims by others that are subjectively accepted by the individual, and go along with a
motivational disposition to respect these claims (Schlicht, 1998, 24). Both entitlements
and obligations are brought about by a set of established rules. They derive from regularities
perceived in the past and in the group and bring about norms and customs.
Given a set of norms and customs within a firm, and a preparedness of the members to
defend the entailed entitlements and honor the implied obligations, we may view behavior
in analogy to the simple co-ordination problem, but on a higher level. Conforming to firm-
specific norms may be individually rational if everybody expects everybody else to defend these
conventions. However the behavioral impact of such rules can not be reduced to incentives.
Rather the rules generate incentives because they elicit entitlements and obligations and induce
behaviors which will mutually be taken into account. The resulting organizational equilibrium,
as governed by entitlements and obligations, may be viewed as a “truce,” as Nelson and Winter
have proposed. It seems to me, however, that this parlance wrongly invokes the idea that
organizational equilibrium is built on latent conflict.4 It suggests that mutual entitlements and
obligations are only obeyed because they are backed up by threats. This is, I think, a misleading
way of looking at organizational equilibrium because truce is usually short-lived, both within
organizations and between nations, and prone to transform either into peace or into war after a
while. It seems thus more appropriate to describe organizational equilibrium as “peace,” where
conflicts have settled down and a possible initial truce has engendered a mutually accepted
arrangement that is defended by everybody, similar to the way in which hierarchies or territorial
claims are defended after settlement.
An analogy can be found in the way in which pecking orders and territoriality are established
among animals. Consider the establishment of a pecking order among hens. There may be
initial fights, but after a while a pecking order is established and only rarely put into question.
The hens generalize apparently from the outcome of one fight to the outcome of the next one
4This holds true for the radical theory of the firm as well, see Marglin (1974). Oliver Williamson (1980) has
commented on that.
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and avoid unnecessary fighting. Or consider territoriality. There may be an initial fight, and the
stronger individual might occupy a certain territory. It will defend its territory and will chase
away potential intruders, but once the territorial boundaries are established real fights will be
rare. The “ownership effect” will induce the owner of a territory to win almost any fight—even
against more powerful intruders. It has obtained, so to speak, an entitlement in the territory,
which induces it to defend it more fiercely than it would fight as an intruder, and the intruders’
aggressiveness is muted by the partial recognition of the territorial rights of the owner. 5 In this
way, ownership generates preferences, as well as incentives. Regarding preferences, it renders
the owner more aggressive and the intruder more yielding. As both the owner and the intruder
will take this effect into account, this changes their incentives for maintaining the territory,
or invading it. The tendency is strengthened among social animals by the way in which the
members of a group maintain or change alliances, and a similar social amplification must be
expected within any social organization.6
4 Consistency
Yet a firm’s internal organization is not fully reducible to routines, norms, and firm-specific
customs. The element of command—emphasized rightly by Coase and Williamson—is of great
importance as well. A firm is neither reducible to custom and norms, nor to hierarchy and
command. All elements interact strongly, and monetary incentives play a role as well. In the
remaining part of the paper I shall comment on the nature of this interaction.7
My main thesis is that the actual working of an organization depends strongly on aspects of
psychological consistency. The term refers to an overall match between various organizational
features, principles, and tacit understandings. It plays an important part in modern compensation
theory, but has much broader significance with regard to organizational matters (Milkovich
and Newman 1999, Baron and Kreps 1999). It bundles command, incentives, and custom
together and implies a strong interaction between command, firm-specific norms and incentives.
Consider the starting point of Coase’s (1937, 35) discussion of the employment relationship.
He notes correctly: “If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go
because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do so.” The foreman is well
advised, however, not to issue arbitrary orders, even if they remain within the limits set by the
employment contract. He must be entitled to order the workman to move, and it will be his
duty not to issue inappropriate orders. The authority of the foreman and the obedience of the
worker will be hurt if the foreman gives incoherent orders. The consistency of his behavior is
tied up with his competence, as perceived by his subordinates, which is an important element
in eliciting authority. He must, for instance, issue similar orders under similar circumstances.
If the worker in department Y is idle each afternoon, but helpful in department X, the foreman
will be bound to send the workman each afternoon to department X. After a while, such an
5See the discussion and references in Schlicht (1998, 111-15, 172-5). Biologists describe the “ownership
effect” as rendering the owner more aggressive than the intruder; see Maynard Smith (1978).
6See De Waal (1983) on the importance of forming alliances in groups of chimpanzees, and Dunbar and
Schutz (2007) for the “social brain” thesis.
7See also Schlicht (1998, 227-33).
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order will appear redundant. The workman will know and go by himself, and he might fear
reprisal if he does not help in department X in the afternoon even if not explicitly ordered to do
so. He will begin to see it as his duty.
Authority is in this way tied up with job roles and responsibilities. Every order and each
decision creates a precedent. It molds entitlements and obligations and strengthens or weakens
authority. As a consequence, every order and each decision must be seen as both directing
resources and shaping firm-specific customs. While a command entered into the keyboard
of a computer may be issued without affecting the basic response of the computer to other
commands, this does not hold true within a firm. Within a firm, every command creates the
expectation that similar future situations will be handled in a similar manner, and weakens
behaviors which appear inconsistent with the command.8 This learning by generalization is
obviously of productive advantage in so far as it automatizes certain adaptations, but may be a
disadvantage in case some generalizations are unwarranted.
5 Williamson's Puzzle
Oliver Williamson has emphasized the “chronic puzzle” about the limits of the firm (Williamson,
1985, Ch. 6). Two firms A and B can do together whatever they could do separately—and
more. There is thus no inefficiency to be expected if firms A and B integrate; we could rather
expect some efficiency gains achievable by selective intervention. The puzzle is that we do not
find firms getting larger and larger. Sometimes it is successful to downsize or split. It must,
therefore, sometimes be cheaper to organize the sets of activities of A and B separately rather
than jointly. As Williamson (1985, 138) put it, “the integrated firm cannot wholly replicate
outside procurement in ‘business as usual’ respects. Instead, there are unavoidable side effects.”
The aspect of consistency contributes to understanding some of these unavoidable side
effects: While firms A and B can each develop a specialized set of customs which are fine-tuned
to their particular needs, firm AB cannot handle similar things differently in its departments A
and B. This would hurt consistency. It may still be possible to differentiate between departments,
but in many cases (such as compensation policies) this is very difficult and costly to sustain. It
is a frequent occurrence that certain activities are outsourced for the simple reason of making
it possible to pay the outsourced workers differently from what they would receive as regular
employees. Janitors are outsourced in order to save on wage payments, computer specialists are
outsourced in order to make it possible to pay them more.9 The consistency requirement works
as a constraint, and disintegration may permit removing this constraint. Conversely, integration
induces the consistency constraint, along with the side effects mentioned by Williamson.
8Some authors take the more extreme view (not to be followed here) that command is entirely bound to the
situation and therefore rule-based and ultimately dissolved by situation-specific requirements (Follett 1940,
p. 59, Brady and Walsh 2008).
9See Mücke (2002) for some illustration.
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6 The Perceptional Theory of the Firm
I have interpreted the firm as an organizational unit that relies on norms and customs for co-
ordination, rather than on market incentives. For such a system to work, the boundaries of the
firm must be recognizable for its members because they must know whether the firm-specific
norms are valid or not. This implies a perceptional theory of the firm: The firm is what the firm
members perceive as a firm. This perception frames and thereby triggers their behavior. Or, in
the terminology of Isaac et al. (1991), firms and other institutions provide institutional frames
which activate certain behaviors rather than others.
From this point of view, the boundaries of the firm relate to perceptional boundaries: A firm
is what people identify as a firm. This notion of the firm is “realistic,” in the sense advocated
by Coase (1937, 54): It “closely approximates the firm as it is considered in the real world.”
The relevance of the “perceptional,” or “realistic,” notion of the firm derives from the fact that
people base their actions on their perceptions. This renders their perceptions economically
relevant.
If a theorist argues that the perceptional view of the firm is too fuzzy and vague, and a more
clear-cut definition, such as the firm as a “nexus of contracts,” or the firm as a “collection of
assets,” is analytically more convenient or fruitful, they must assume a priori that the notion of
the firm entertained by the economic subjects themselves does not carry behavioral implications
(Jensen and Meckling 1976, Moore 1992). In contrast, the consistency argument advanced
here emphasized the behavioral entailments of perceptions, and implies that the notion of the
firm would actually be superfluous if it did not carry such behavioral implications.
7 Low-Powered Incentives
Williamson (1985, 140) has contrasted the prevalence of low-powered incentives within
firms with the high-powered incentives prevalent in markets. While no a-priori reason can
be given for firms not to deviate from markets in the other direction and offer super-powered
incentives, several reasons for the attenuation of incentives within firms have been advanced.
The consistency view adds some further arguments for attenuation.
According to the consistency view, firms rely on norm-guided behavior. The set of entitle-
ments and obligations which regulates co-operation cannot be mixed easily with incentives,
because the provision of incentives changes entitlements and obligations. Once a worker
receives performance pay, this removes his obligation to work fast on order. The presence of
performance pay creates the entitlement on the part of the worker to choose his own pace of
work, and weakens or removes his obligation to work as being told.10 The theoretical argument
relates to the theory of self-attribution (Schlicht, 1998, Ch. 9). It suggests, for instance,
that incentives may reduce cooperation, and this has been confirmed experimentally (Falk
and Fehr 1998, Fehr and Gächter 2002). As firms must rely on norm-guided co-operation,
10This thought may help to understand the difference between incentives and command and may contribute
to resolve Clark’s(1984) puzzle that incentives that must be considered optimal from a principal-agent
perspective have been replaced by authority in many capital-intensive factories in the late nineteenth century.
Only if authority works differently from incentives, these findings make sense.
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and wage compression and an attenuation of incentives may improve the workings of duty of
command, such features are to be expected.
8 Fairness
The thought that norm-guided behavior is important within firms may also be re-phrased in a
different way by building on Simon’s (1951) theory of the employment relationship. Consider
two different tasks, A and B. Assume initially that the worker is indifferent about whether to
perform the one or the other. An exchange contract would specify under which conditions
the worker would perform which. An employment contract would leave that unspecified. The
firm would be free to decide, according to the situation, which task the worker is to perform.
As long as the worker is indifferent between the tasks, he will be indifferent between the
exchange contract and an employment contract. The firm, however, will prefer the employment
contract, as this permits postponing the decision about which task to perform. It permits greater
flexibility. The employment contract carries an option value, just as the holding of money
rather than some illiquid assed entails liquidity. This is, in a nutshell, Simon’s explanation of
the employment contract.
Consider now the case that the the worker is not indifferent between tasks A and B but
prefers task A. An employment contract faces the difficulty that the worker may be hesitant
to agree on entering a contract that leves the choice between A and B entirely in the hands
of the firm, as he may fear of becoming exploited by being ordered to work exclusively on
the dreary task B. In order to render an employment contract viable, the firm must credibly
commit itself to compensate the worker for additional toil. By offering extra payment for task B
(working at night, working abroad), the worker can be made indifferent between the tasks, and
the employment contract can serve the function of postponing the decision about performing
task A or task B.
From this point of view it it is no coincidence that business men talk about “compensation”
rather than “pay.” Practitioners aim for a “consistent” wage structure that offers rewards in
proportion to the time needed to perform a task, and to the strain and attention required, rather
than to bribe workers to perform the one rather than the other task. This would undermine the
possibility of directing workers by command. Command requires that command is accepted.
Another way to maintain the viability of the employment contract in cases where workers
are not indifferent between performing different tasks is to implement practices that fix the
share of the various tasks while maintaining the flexibility of timing, viz. maintaining the shares
of task A and B while leaving it to the firm’s discretion when to ask the worker to perform
task A or task B, repectively. A worker who has been assigned to the streneous task B for
some time would obtain the “right” for being compensated by being assigned preferentially to
task A for a while, etc. This would, again, make the workers ultimately indifferent between
performing the different tasks. Such practices relate obviously to fair treatment of the workers.
Such observation of fairness requirements is a fundamental prerequisite for rendering the
employment contract viable, and enabling its superior efficiency features.
Fairness in the employment contract—in the sense of offering compensation for more
exerting tasks, in one way or the other—contribute to efficiency by bringing about product
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prices that reflect social costs. All this is quite remote from concerns about those kinds of
incentives that are in the focus of the principal-agent paradigm. Such incentives may play a
role in cases where observability is a problem. Within firms this seems to be less important, as
you cannot compensate or incentivise what you can’t observe. You can, however, render the
performance of tasks more attractive by offering performance pay, especially in cases where
problems of observability do not arise. It is, therfore, not surprising that incentives are usually
framed as a fair share in the value that has been created by the worker to the benefit of the firm.
Such payments are much smaller than principal-agent theory would predict (Frank, 1984).
Well-known phenomena like the attenuation of incentives, wage compression, or selection
wages would not be observed if the principal-agent view of the employment contract were
correct.
To phrase these thoughts in still another way: Within markets, prices co-ordinate various
economic activities. Within firms, co-ordination is achieved by the assignment of duties and
reponsibilities, and by direct control and supervision, and by supplementing all this by fair
and consistent compensation structures.. These mechanisms of co-ordination within firms are
rendered viable by normative structures that ultimately build on perceptions of fairness and
legitimacy.
9 Routines and Change
The evolutionary theory of the firm emphasizes the function of routines to co-ordinate the
division of labor within firms. The emphasis on routines, although in many ways quite relevant,
hides the fact that the various routines to be found in a firm are tied together by consistency
requirements. Similar cases must be treated similarly. Otherwise, entitlements and obligations
will not match, and co-ordination cannot work smoothly. Further, the evolutionary view tends
to conceive change as brought about by blind trial and error. This is misleading. Coase
(1978, 244) has pointed this out nicely: “The firm, the market, the legal system are all social
institutions and are the result of purposeful human activity. . . . natural selection has an IQ
of zero. The IQ of businessmen and politicians may not be high, but it is not zero. Natural
selection produces its results by trial and error over long periods of time. Economic systems,
such as the structure of an industry, may be transformed within a single generation.” Economic
change is neither blind nor fully rational.
It seems to me that this “intermediate” character of economic change—neither blind nor
prescient—can be analyzed fruitfully from a consistency perspective. Firms respond to changing
conditions by changing or enlarging their repertoire of action, and they seek improvements
by building on their competencies. All this must be done in a piecemeal way and using the
means at hand while maintaining overall consistency, even in times of change. The firm is
not re-shaped optimally in response to each and every change in the environment; rather the
existing routines are kept, or modified, or extended, and aligned with each oither.11 It would
11Alchian (1984, 47) takes the principal-agent view to the extreme and concludes: “It is not silly to consider the
entry of a new stockholder to be the creation of a new firm.” This neglects the costs of setting up a system
of rules which co-ordinate interaction. Once this is taken into account, any change (like the entry of a new
stockholder) must be integrated into the existing set of routines, customs, and firm-specific norms, rather than
9
not be “rational” to start anew at each point in time; rather it is reasonable to respond to new
exigencies, or find new solutions, by starting from the prevailing set of routines, norms and
customs, and by extending and changing them to meet new exigencies. As the prevailing set of
routines is tied together by consistency requirements, organizational change is channeled by by
these requirements, just as biological change is channeled by physical and genetic conditions
Schlicht (1997).
10 Concluding Remarks
The consistency view of organization highlights some often neglected aspects of organizational
performance. It requires transcending the standard assumptions on human behavior used in
economics, as epitomized by the principal-agent view. The above discussion was intended to
introduce this thought and to relate it to some selected topics in the theory of the firm. What
has been left out here is a more detailed examination of possible empirical predictions and a
more systematic discussion of the underlying model of man.
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